

Complex interplay between monetary and fiscal policies in a real economy model

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Plan of the Talk

- ▶ **Business cycle models and the money market**
- ▶ **Monetary vs. fiscal policies for stabilization purposes**
- ▶ **A baseline multiplier-accelerator model with the money market**
- ▶ **Stability conditions, dynamics and policy implications**
- ▶ **Concluding remarks**

Motivation I

- ▶ Macroeconomic variables exhibit **persistent** and **irregular** fluctuations and several models aim at detecting the endogenous sources of such oscillations.
- ▶ The literature that stems from this idea is widespread and developed (see e.g. Kalecki, Samuelson, Kaldor, Hicks).
- ▶ Among these, the Samuelsonian **multiplier-accelerator** modelling approach is considered a **benchmark** to explain business cycle fluctuations.
- ▶ An objection to business cycle models based on the interaction of the multiplier and the accelerator is that they usually **neglect monetary factors**.
- ▶ Only a few papers examined the role of the monetary policy within this framework (Smith, 1963; Lovell and Prescott, 1968; Karpetis and Varelas, 2012).

Motivation II

- ▶ **Fiscal** policy and **monetary** policy are the two tools used to achieve the macroeconomic objectives.
- ▶ There exists a debate on the proper **degree of activism** in fiscal and monetary policy making.
- ▶ By 2008-2009, as monetary policy became less effective, the alternative to monetary policy was to turn back to fiscal policy.
- ▶ What are the **key properties** to design simple rules governing the conduct of a **stabilization** policy?
- ▶ How much to **vary** monetary and fiscal instruments to reduce market turmoil?

This paper I

- ▶ We augment the nonlinear multiplier-accelerator setting by taking into account a **money market**.
- ▶ We examine the effects of the **interplay** between monetary factors and the fiscal policy instruments.
- ▶ A **nonlinear investment function** takes into account the presence of the monetary sector through the interest rate.
- ▶ The **money supply** is influenced by the discrepancy between the full employment national income level and the more recent output realizations.
- ▶ The public sector may influence the possibility to reach a full employment output level through a **level-adjusting** rule.

This paper II

- ▶ The introduction of the monetary policy is able to lead the economy toward the **targeted** level of output.
- ▶ There is not an unambiguous role played by the two policies.
- ▶ **Endogenous fluctuations** may arise in the presence of overreaction to the real economy signals.
- ▶ The effect of endogenizing the money market may also imply **multistability**.

The baseline model

- ▶ The macroeconomic **equilibrium condition** is given by

$$Y_t = C_t + I_t + G_t \quad (1)$$

where Y_t , C_t , I_t and G_t respectively denote the national income, consumption, investments and public expenditures.

- ▶ **Consumption** is described as

$$C_t = \bar{C} + cY_{t-1} \quad (2)$$

- ▶ The **government** establishes a full employment income Y^F and modifies its **expenditures** according to

$$G_t = \bar{G} + g(Y^F - Y_{t-1}) \quad (3)$$

- ▶ **Investments** increase in the national income variation and negatively depend on the interest rate

$$I_t = \bar{I} + \gamma a_2 \left(\frac{a_1 + a_2}{a_1 e^{-(Y_{t-1} - Y_{t-2})} + a_2} - 1 \right) + \varphi R_t \quad (4)$$

The money market

- ▶ The usual equilibrium condition in the **money market** reads as

$$\frac{M_t^S}{\bar{P}} = \frac{M_t^D}{\bar{P}} \quad (5)$$

- ▶ The **money demand** function is determined in accordance with the liquidity preference

$$M_t^D = d_1 Y_{t-1} + d_2 R_t \quad (6)$$

- ▶ The monetary authority aims at **moderating** economic fluctuations with respect to the benchmark of a full employment income Y^F (see also Gavin and Kydland, 1999):

$$M_t^S = M_{t-1}^S + \mu(Y^F - (1 - \theta)Y_{t-1} - \theta Y_{t-2}), \quad (7)$$

where $\mu > 0$ and $\theta \in [0, 1)$.

- ▶ From the money market equilibrium we get

$$R_t = \frac{1}{d_2} (M_{t-1}^S + \mu(Y^F - (1 - \theta)Y_{t-1} - \theta Y_{t-2}) - d_1 Y_{t-1}) \quad (8)$$

A 3D map for the dynamics of Y and M

- ▶ The evolution of national income and money is described by the following **three-dimensional** map

$$T : \begin{cases} Y_t &= A + Y_{t-1}c - g(Y_{t-1} - Y^F) + a_2\gamma \left(\frac{a_1 + a_2}{a_2 + a_1 e^{-(Y_{t-1} - Z_{t-1})}} - 1 \right) \\ &+ \frac{\varphi}{d_2} (M_{t-1} + \mu(Y^F - (1 - \theta)Y_{t-1} - \theta Z_{t-1}) - d_1 Y_{t-1}), \\ M_t &= M_{t-1} + \mu(Y^F - (1 - \theta)Y_{t-1} - \theta Z_{t-1}), \\ Z_t &= Y_{t-1}. \end{cases} \quad (9)$$

where $Z_t \equiv Y_{t-1}$ has been introduced.

- ▶ We shall focus on the role of the **policy parameters** g , μ and θ .

Existence of the steady state

Proposition

The system in (9) has a unique steady state given by

$$(Y^*, M^*, Z^*) = \left(Y^F, \frac{d_2 \left(Y^F(1-c) - A + \frac{Y^F d_1 \varphi}{d_2} \right)}{\varphi}, Y^F \right)$$

to which corresponds the interest rate

$$R^* = \frac{Y^F(1-c) - A}{\varphi}.$$

Moreover, the values of (Y^, M^*, Z^*) are positive provided that*

$$\frac{A}{(1-c) + d_1 \varphi / d_2} < Y^F < \frac{A}{(1-c)}.$$

Local stability conditions

Proposition

The steady state (Y^*, M^*, Z^*) is **locally asymptotically stable** if $\tilde{\gamma} < 1$ and

- when $0 \leq \theta < \frac{1}{2}$

$$0 \leq \mu < s_2 \quad \text{if} \quad g < c + 4\tilde{\gamma} - 1 + 4\theta(1 - \tilde{\gamma}) - d_1\tilde{\varphi}$$

$$0 \leq \mu < s_1 \quad \text{if} \quad c + 4\tilde{\gamma} - 1 + 4\theta(1 - \tilde{\gamma}) - d_1\tilde{\varphi} \leq g < 2\tilde{\gamma} + 1 + c - d_1\tilde{\varphi}$$

- when $\frac{1}{2} \leq \theta \leq 1$

$$0 \leq \mu < s_2 \quad \text{if} \quad g < c + 2\tilde{\gamma} + 1 - d_1\tilde{\varphi}$$

$$s_1 < \mu < s_2 \quad \text{if} \quad 2\tilde{\gamma} + 1 + c - d_1\tilde{\varphi} < g < c + 4\tilde{\gamma} - 1 + 4\theta(1 - \tilde{\gamma}) - d_1\tilde{\varphi}$$

where

$$s_1 = \frac{2\tilde{\varphi}(2\tilde{\gamma} - (g - c + d_1\tilde{\varphi}) + 1)}{1 - 2\theta} \quad \text{and} \quad s_2 = \frac{\tilde{\varphi}(g - c + d_1\tilde{\varphi} + 1)(1 - \tilde{\gamma})}{(\tilde{\gamma}(1 - \theta) + \theta)}.$$

Stability regions I




Figure: Stability regions of (Y^*, M^*, Z^*) for different θ , on varying μ and g .

- ▶ If μ increases, introducing a fiscal policy has an **initial stabilizing** effect, which is thwarted by increasing the degree of its reactivity g .
- ▶ When a higher weight is assigned to the past levels of national income, a **stronger** reaction of the fiscal policy is required.
- ▶ When $1/2 < \theta \leq 1$ a sufficiently reactive monetary policy can **counterbalance** the destabilizing effects of the fiscal policy.

Stability regions II







Figure: Stability regions of (Y^*, M^*, Z^*) for different g , on varying θ and μ .



- ▶ The steady state can be **destabilized** on increasing θ as long as the monetary authority reacts slightly more to the output deviations.
- ▶ When the degree of the fiscal reactivity increases, there exists a **double stability threshold** on increasing μ .
- ▶ If the reactivity of the fiscal policy is too large, a form of **inertia** in the response of the monetary policy ($\theta > 1/2$) allows to gain stability.

No monetary policy inertia





- ▶ Convergence to the steady state may be replaced by convergence to a 2-cycle (red region).
- ▶ **Path dependence:** the steady state may coexist with a cycle of period 3.
- ▶ A strong reactivity of the monetary policy coupled with a sufficient reactivity of the fiscal policy may lead to **complex dynamics**.

No fiscal policy




- ▶ For increasing values of μ , the steady state turns unstable and complex dynamics arise with **endogenous fluctuations** in the business cycle.
- ▶ When there is no space for the fiscal policy and the monetary policy inertia is low, the steady state is stable.
- ▶ When θ grows the steady state loses stability via a (subcritical) **Neimark-Sacker** bifurcation.
- ▶ An increase in the degree of **inertia** in the money supply rule is **not necessarily** an advantage in terms of reaching the desired output level.

Joint role of monetary and fiscal policy







- ▶ General increase in the size of the white region, which is associated to the stability of the steady state.
- ▶ Double stability threshold when the monetary policy **aggressively** reacts.
- ▶ The range of parameters θ for which the steady state remains locally stable is quite **narrow** and a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation of the steady state occurs.

Multistability and coexisting business cycles



- ▶ The introduction of the monetary policy is responsible for generating the **business cycle**.
- ▶ An **excessive tightening** of monetary policy may lead to **instability** in other sectors, with a negative effect on economic actors' behavior by weakening their assessment of the future dynamics.

Basins of attractions



Concluding remarks

- ▶ We sneak into the debate on which of the two instruments is better able to pursue the **stabilization objective**.
- ▶ From a static viewpoint, the monetary policy is **able** to lead the economy to the desired output equilibrium level.
- ▶ The **interaction** of the two policy instruments causes a variety of **local bifurcation** scenarios.
- ▶ The introduction of the monetary policy can have **beneficial** effects in leading the economy toward the full employment income.
- ▶ Both the **government** and the **monetary authority** are able to **influence** the size and the persistence of the oscillations by properly tuning their policy instruments.
- ▶ **Coexistence** of different attractors, making the choices of policy makers crucial to shift the output in the desired direction.